Wednesday, February 21, 2007

IDS Article focuses on recent class topic

As I was perusing through today's IDS, I came across an article titled "Dropped Call Collision". The article discusses a current measure being discussed within the Indiana state legislature that imposes restrictions on cell phone use by teenage drivers. The article sparked my curiosity and brought me back to the issue of unintentional discrimination which was the focus of our most recent writing assignment. Obviously the bill is being brought forth in an attempt to make Indiana's roads safer, but is it fair to impose these restrictions only on teenagers? This issue raises the issue of disparate impact, but lacks the element of having an impact on the employee-employer relationship. The real question here is, what happens when the government uses discrimination as a means of protecting it's citizens? Does the fact that the bill is meant to promote safety make it acceptable that it discriminates against teenagers?

Perhaps a better solution to this problem that doesn't discriminate against a particular group of people would be to impose restrictions on new drivers, regardless of their age. Such a restriction based on experience would be similar to the "90-day rule" that currently exists in Indiana. The "90-day rule" doesn't allow new drivers to have anyone riding in the car for 90 days unless there is an individual that is at least 21 years of age. What do you think are some other proposals the state could use to promote safety that doesn't discriminate based on the age of the driver?

5 Comments:

Blogger Nick Hursh said...

I think it is somewhat unfair to solely impose this law on teenage drivers. While teenage drivers are succeptible to more accidents, so are elderly people and other adults that are not precautious while driving. Many people today use cell phones while driving, so I think they should either make the law apply to everyone or do away with the law completely. However, I agree with the idea of attaching the prohibition of cell phone use during the 90 day rule that currently is in place in Indiana. This addition would allow teenagers to take more precautions while beginning to adapt to all the situations that driving poses. Illinois currently has a law prohibiting cell phone usage in the city of Chicago. I am not sure if this applies elsewhere in the state or anything else that it entails. Nontheless, teenagers should not be the only ones singled out in having to apply with this cell phone rule.

12:12 PM  
Blogger Justin said...

I may be misunderstanding your argument, but aren't you just substituting a disparate-treatment law with a disparate-impact law?

In the context of Title VII, if UPS had a company policy that restricted how far its teenage truck drivers could go (and thus limiting promotion possibility), these truck drivers could sue for age discrimination using a disparate treatment claim. Here, UPS is explicitly treating teenagers differently because of their age.

Similar to your solution, if UPS instead had a policy that restricted how far new drivers could go, teenage truck drivers could still sue for age discrimination. This time, they would use a disparate impact claim because most new drivers are teenagers.

In either case the same result is acheived, whether UPS wants to restrict teenagers directly or indirectly.

Bringing this back to your argument, what is the point in changing the law if it has virtually the same effect?

6:04 PM  
Blogger Professor Prenkert said...

In many ways this is an interesting conversation on the level of theory/policy; however, as I am wont to do from time to time, I need to make sure we understand some fundamental legal issues.

First, the U.S. Constitution through the Equal Protection Clause actually does protect against certain kinds of unwarranted distinctions made between or among classes of citizens on a whole array of bases. As a result, the government (state or federal) must have some kind of justification for making such distinctions. The strength of the constitutionally-required justification varies depending on the distinction that is made. Distinctions that are made on the basis of "suspect classifications" -- e.g., race, national origin, religion, and alienage -- must be justified by showing it is targeted to fulfill a compelling state interest and is necessary to serve that interest. Non-suspect classifications, like age, need only to be justified by showing that there is some rational basis for the classification (i.e., that the classification is rationally related to some legitimate state interest). In the case of the proposed law that Max has identified, the "discrimination" that results from the classification of drivers into teenage and non-teenage with regard to cell phone use is in line with other laws that have been upheld as rationally related to the state interest in protecting public safety and the safety of younger members of society by making distinctions on the basis of young age. So, while the law would no doubt be discriminatory (as many laws are . . . you also can't drive until you're 16 and can't legally drink alcohol until you're 21), it would be a constitutionally permissible form of discrimination.

Also, the Supreme Court has held that there is no viable disparate impact theory under the Equal Protection Clause. In other words, only those actions by state actors that are purposeful/intentional classifications are actionable, not policies or rules that lead to disparities based on some classification. (Though, The Supreme Court has held that legislatures are free to prohibit unintended discriminatory consequences of neutral policies or rules, just as Congress did with Title VII.)

Second, we'll talk more about this after spring break, but just to give you a preview, the major federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of age (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) only protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older against discrimination in favor of relatively younger workers. In other words, teenagers (like anyone else under 40) are not protected against discrimination on the basis of their age. Moreover, if someone is treated worse than a co-worker because he or she is younger than the better-treated co-worker, the ADEA does not prohibit such treatment, even if the worse-treated worker is over the age of 40.

Finally, as we'll discuss when we get to age discrimination in employment, the ADEA does incorporate the disparate impact theory, but in a quite limited form.

Keep up the interesting conversation. I just thought I would clarify a few technicalities of existing law for you.

10:47 AM  
Blogger Max Brown said...

Justin, I may indeed be confusing disparate impact and treatment. However, the point I'm getting at is the fairness of focusing a law specifically towards teenagers. The point of changing the law is to ensure that the law is applied similarly to all individuals, not applied differently between different age groups. In other words, I'm saying that it is unfair to restrict only teenagers from using cell phones so that they become better drivers before being allowed to add in multiple distractions. The rule should apply to all individuals that are new drivers, not just teenagers. It just seems as though the rule is implying that new drivers are allowed to use cell phones while they drive, but new drivers that happen to be teenagers are not.

In response to what professor Prenkert said, I realize that rules that restrict alcohol consumption or age limits for people to drive effectively serve as a form of discrimination. However, I feel that such discrimination is acceptable in this instance because every individual is discriminated against equally. In the example involving cell phone usage, teenagers are being singled out because of their inexperience behind the wheel of a car. I'm suggesting that cell phone usage by new drivers is acceptable because it places the emphasis on the driver, not the age of the driver.

3:30 PM  
Blogger Professor Prenkert said...

Max: With the understanding that we're talking policy now and not whether the law itself can pass constitutional muster or is otherwise "legal," it's not just the newness of the driver that's the issue. It's the newness combined with the immaturity and poor judgment that is generally more prevalent in the teenage years that supports the decision to single out teenaged drivers.

9:03 AM  

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